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JURISDICTION AND NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS 
dismissed plaintiff's 
This is an appeal from a non-final Order entered in a 
civil action pursuant to a motion for summary judgment, whereby 
the Third Judicial District Court, in and for Salt Lake County, 
the Honorable Leonard Russon presiding, 
claim against certain defendants. Such non-final Order became 
final in accordance with Rule 54, Utah Rules of Civil 
Procedure, pursuant to a subsequent Ordpr which resolved all 
remaining issues as to all defendants. 
jurisdiction to hear this appeal pursuant to Utah Code Ann. 
§78-2-2 (1987). 
This Court has 
ISSUE PRESENTED 
Does the correspondence, registration procedures and 
course of dealing by and between appellant and respondent 
i 
satisfy the requirement for a "memoranditim or note" under Utah 
Code Annotated §25-5-4(5). 
DETERMINATIVE STATUSES 
While the issues before the Court are fact intensive, 
the statute believed to be determinativ^ of such issue is 
set forth in §25-5-4(5) of the Utah Codq Annotated, and 
reads, in its entirety, as follows: 
25-5-4 CERTAIN AGREEMENTS VOID UNLESS 
WRITTEN AND SUBSCRIBED. In tl^ e following 
cases every agreement shall be void unless 
such agreement, or some note oir memorandum 
thereof, is in writing subscribed bv the 
party to be charged therewith: 
(1) Every agreement that by its terms is 
notl to be performed within one year from 
thq making thereof. 
(2) Every promise to answer for the 
det|t, default or miscarriage of another. 
undertaking 
(3) Every agreement, promise or 
tg made upon consideration of 
except mutual promises to marry. mazfriage 
(4) Every special promise made by an 
executor or administrator to answer in 
damages for the liabilities, or to pay the 
debts, or the testator or intestate out of 
hi? own estate. 
(5) Every agreement authorizing or 
employing an agent or broker to purchase or 
se1\ real estate for compensation. 
STATEMENT OF THE CASE 
I. 
Nature of the Case 
This is an action brought by Machan Hampshire 
Properties ( 
commission f 
Utah corpora 
Loan Corpora 
K-E Enterpri 
Park") which 
•Machan") to recover a 4 percent real estate 
rom Western Real Estate and Development Company, a 
jtion ("Western Real Estate") ; Western Mortgage and 
jtion ("Western Mortgage"), a Utah corporation; and 
fees, a Utah general partnership ("K-E"), with 
respect to the sale of the Iomega Industrial Park ("Iomega 
was owned and sold by Western Mortgage and K-E to 
Birtcher Invfestments ("Birtcher"), and to recover damages from 
Birtcher and| Capitalcorp Financial, Inc. ("Capitalcorp") for 
tortious interference with contract and/or prospective economic 
relations. 
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After some initial discovery, Machan moved for 
summary judgment against Western Mortgage, Western Real Estate, 
and K-E on its contract claim for a 4 percent real estate 
commission. In addition to opposing Mabhan's motion, Western 
Mortgage, Western Real Estate, and K-E filed a motion for 
summary judgment against Machan seeking a dismissal of Machanfs 
contract claim. Several issues were raised, briefed, and 
argued in connection with the parties1 Respective motions for 
summary judgment. In its Order dated JUly 22, 1986, the trial 
court denied Machan's motion and granted the summary judgment 
motion brought by Western Mortgage, Western Real Estate, and 
K-E, thereby dismissing Machan's claim for a real estate 
commission. (R. at 453-55; Appendix l.J The trial court, 
however, based its ruling in favor of Western Mortgage, et al., 
solely on the basis that "plaintiff's c^aim is barred by the 
Statute of Frauds set forth in Utah Cod^ Ann. §25-5-4(5) 
because no writing exists memorializing the claimed agreement 
to pay a commissions." Id. 
The Order dated July 22, 1986, did not resolve the 
tortious interference claims brought by Machan against Birtcher 
and Capitalcorp and, accordingly, was nqt a final Order 
pursuant to Rule 54(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure. After 
further discovery, and based upon the trial court's prior 
ruling relative to the Statute of Frauds, the parties 
stipulated to the entry of a final Order- resolving all claims 
as against all parties. Pursuant to the Stipulation, the trial 
court entered its Order dated September 25, 1987, resolving all 
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recognized 
remaining 
constituting 
appeal. (R. 
Th 
based, 
interference 
Capitalcorp 
void due to 
preserved 
obtains a 
issues 
Order dated 
Statute of F 
relevant to 
with respect to all remaining parties, thereby 
the final Order from which Machan brings this 
at 553-56; Appendix 2.) 
s Order, and the Stipulation on which it was 
plaintiff's inability to pursue its tortious 
of contract claims against Birtcher and 
n light of the ruling that any such contract was 
he Statute of Frauds. Accordingly, the parties 
's right to pursue this claim if, on appeal, it 
of the Order dated July 22, 1986. 
upon the narrow scope of the trial court's 
•jTuly 22, 1986, relative to the application of the 
auds, Machan hereby sets forth only those facts 
the issue on appeal. 
Machan 
reversal 
Based 
II. 
Statement of the Facts 
Mabhan is a Utah corporation authorized, among other 
things, to a 
At all times 
pquire, develop, purchase, and sell real estate, 
relevant to this case, Mr. Robert Polcha 
("Polcha") was a licensed real estate broker and salesman 
affiliated wLth Machan. (Polcha Aff'd., R. at 77; Polcha 1985 
Depo. pp. 3 and 4*.) Western Mortgage is a Utah corporation 
which engages in the business of first mortgage lending. 
Western Real Estate is a Utah corporation engaged in the real 
estate development business and is a wholly owned subsidiary of 
Western Mortgage. K-E is a Utah general partnership. Mr. J. 
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Kelly Goddard ("Goddard'1), at all times! relevant to this case, 
was a vice president of Western Mortgage, the president of 
Western Real Estate, and a general partner in K-E. (Goddard 
Aff'd., R. at 208; Goddard Depo. pp. 6-11.) 
Prior to January 1986, Western Mortgage and K-E were 
the record owners of approximately 16.61 acres of land located 
in Roy, Utah, known as the IOmega Industrial Park. (Goddard 
Aff'd., R. at 208.) 
In or about January 1985, Polcha had a telephone 
conversation with Goddard wherein Polcha inquired about 
properties Western Real Estate was marketing. Goddard 
responded by stating that the IOmega Park property was for 
sale. Polcha requested that Goddard forward a package of 
information about the IOmega Park for distribution to Polcha's 
clients. Goddard agreed to send such information to Polcha. 
(Polcha Aff'd., R. at 77-78; Goddard Aff'd., R. at 210-11; 
Goddard Depo. p. 28.) 
During the course of this or Some other earlier 
conversation, Goddard agreed to allow Pplcha to register his 
clients with Goddard and indicated that he would keep a log 
entry of the same. (Goddard Depo. p. 6?; see also, Polcha 
Depo. (1986) pp. 18, 19; Polcha Aff'd., |R. at 77-78.) In this 
log, Goddard would record or register tlje name of the broker 
together with the clients or investors with whom such broker 
was working. The purpose of the registration system was to 
protect the broker's commission, and to avoid the embarrassing 
duplication which would occur if two or jmore brokers were 
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presenting the same client to the seller. (Id.) Polcha 
claims that, during this conversation, he inquired about the 
commission tcp be paid and Goddard agreed to pay a 4 percent 
commission. I(Polcha Aff'd., R. at 78.) Goddard claims that he 
"did not comihit to pay any specific commission amount during 
that [February 1985] conversation.11 (Goddard Aff'd., R. at 
211.) 
By|cover letter dated February 21, 1985, Goddard sent 
Polcha information on IOmega Park. (Goddard Depo. pp. 22-31, 
55-56, Exhibits 2 and 7, R. at 262.) Goddard's letter dated 
1985, states, in part, as follows: February 21, 
As I indicated to you on the phone, we 
halve accepted another offer, and should you 
have success in obtaining a buyer, be sure 
thpy understand it would be a back-up 
ofper. 
Id. Polcha 
Mr. Goddard 
(Polcha Aff' 
[supplemented the information he received from 
and began distributing the same to his clients. 
p., R. at 78.) Thereafter, Polcha requested 
additional information on the IOmega Park and Goddard provided 
the same. (Goddard Depo. pp. 59-60, Exhibit 12.) In turn, 
Polcha forwarded such information to his clients. (See, 
Polcha Depo. (1986), Exhibit 13.) 
By letter dated February 26, 1985, Polcha reiterated 
the agreement he had with Goddard respecting the payment of a 
4 percent commission and, in conjunction therewith, registered 
with Goddard certain clients. Mr. Polcha's letter dated 
February 26J 1985, reads, in part, as follows: 
Machan Hampshire Properties, Inc./Robert F. 
Pdlcha represents the following clients in 
-6-
connection with the proposed purchase of 
the subject properties. The purpose of 
this letter is to register th£ clients with 
you and to set forth in our understanding 
that in the event a transaction is 
consummated between yourself £nd these 
clients, you agree to pay a cbmmission to 
Machan Hampshire Properties, inc./Robert F 
Polcha. Said commission shaljL be four 
percent (4%) on Iomega Park. 
Cal-Fed Syndications 
Birtcher American Properties 
Equitable Life Real Estate Division. 
By letters dated March r March 12, and March 28, 
April 12, April 30, -•• Mr Polcha continued 
'**- - - - - .. ,-troduce the Iomega 
Park property , such letters again reiterated the agreement 
that Western Real Estate would pay to Machan a 4% commission in 
the event the sale was consummate-' • '/. :"c*.: * -
(Polcha Depo. (. • 6) and Goddard Depo., Exhibits " \ ". '
 m 
16, and 17.) 
Sometime in July, August, •- September, 198 5, Goddard 
te.-..,. • . and indicated hat the previous 
sale : ..- ZOmega Park property had fallen through and that 
i 
such property was back on the market, (toddard also requested 
Mr. Polcha to contact" hi* clients tic see if;; they In ad any 
continuing interest . .- :he Iomega Park property, (Polcha 
Aff'd., R. at 80; see also,, Goddard Aff'jd., R, at 2 09, 
212.) 
. ;ha had not received any 
negative response to his registration letters -*_ Goddard 
Depo. pp. 56-59, 62-66, letter dated August 1985, Mr 
Polcha at •-• - • -. - . - vi titled the 
- 7 
Estate of James Campbell. (Goddard Depo., Exhibit 18.) In the 
August 7, 1985 letter, Mr. Polcha indicated that the commission 
would be 5% of the gross selling price should the Iomega Park 
property be sold to the Estate of James Campbell. (Id.) By 
letter dated August 9, 1985, Mr. Goddard responded to Mr. 
Polchafs August 7 letter. In his responser Goddard stated as 
follows: 
InI response to your letter, we have only 
agreed to pay 4% commission on the above 
patk.All other terms of your letter are 
acceptable. 
(Goddard Depo., Exhibit 19; Appendix 3.) (Emphasis added.) 
On 
Investments, 
September 6, 
September 3, 19859 Birtcher, known as Birtcher 
signed a letter of intent to purchase the Iomega 
Park property. (Goddard Depo., Exhibit 20.) By letter dated 
1985, Goddard, acting on instructions from John 
Goddard, infprmed Polcha that he had been receiving 
Mr. Polcha1s| letters of registratioA of clients, but that he 
would not hohor such registration for certain clients. The 
letter further states as follows: 
Thpugn most are acceptable, the following 
were contacted prior to receipt of your 
letters: 
1. DeAuza Corporation. 
2. August Financial. 
3. Birtcher Properties/Cap Corp. 
Therefore, we cannot recognize the above. 
Should you have any questions, please 
contact me. 
(Goddard Depp. pp. 78-80; Goddard Depo., Exhibit 21; Appendix 
4.) (Emphasjis added.) 
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Shortly after learning JI thej letter of intent 
submitted by Birtcher, Goddc • : : ;formed| Mr. Mullins, the 
president of Western Mortgage, that Macjian had registered 
Birtcher with Western Real Estate. In response - * question 
"what did Mr Mull, ins say tu you in response"1 
responded as follows: 
My comment was I had received!a 
registration from Machan Properties back in 
the spring from Birtcher, and that, you 
know, there may a situation tljiere that he 
might want to look at, and hejsaid, f0h, 
absolutely not. How does he possibly feel 
he deserves a commission when he didn't 
bring us the deal, Cap/corp did?1 T Qaid I 
am just telling you there was a 
registration letter back in tfte spring. So 
he says something to the effect, 'well, 
there is no way he could justify a 
commission if he didn't do anything.* So 
that about ended it. 
(Goddard Depo, p 76.) After inquiry fifom Polcha respecting 
Goddard's September 6 letter, wherein Goddard indicated that 
Western Real Estate had prion: contact with Birfchei: Goddard, 
In d Jet.ter dated September 12, 1985, claimed that 
"Capcorp./Birtcher had presented their coffer r January 30, 
1985, as you well know " (Goddard Depo. pp 
Exhibit ? ! « i In ij ^ ubyequent telephone .conversation wherein 
Polcha asserted he was entitled to a coitimission, Goddard 
responded as follows: 
Bob (polcha) was aware we were working 
with Cap/corp., and it was Cap/corp. that 
brought us the deal, not Machan 
Properties. Had Machan walked in with thi s 
deal from Machan Properties, then they 
would have received the commis|sion, but 
just to arbitrarily mail out a| letter with 
no closing date on the contract, anybody 
can do that, that's what T told him, 'Had 
-9-
you brought us the deal, we would have 
honored your commission. You didn't. 
Cap/corp. has brought us the deal. We have 
been working with Cap/corp. since day one, 
ana you're fully aware of it, so whether 
thiir investors just happened to be your 
investors is a personal problem.f 
(Goddard Depd>. pp. 45-46; Appendix 5.) (Emphasis added.) 
An agreement of purchase and sale of real property 
was made on <pr about September 27, 1985, naming Birtcher 
Investments is the buyer at a price of $7,425,000.00. (Goddard 
Depo. pp. 23+24, Exhibit 1.) 
SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT 
Thfe Statute of Frauds is designed to prevent, in 
certain cases, honest men from being ensnared, by perjury and 
fraud, in alleged contracts that they never made. In 
fulfilling tnis purpose, however, courts have routinely refused 
to utilize the Statute of Frauds to defeat contractual 
obligations voluntarily assumed. In order to fulfill the 
underlying purpose of the statute, courts require the presence 
of some "note or memorandum" that has substantial probative 
value in establishing the existence of a contract. Such "note 
or memorandum" need not be set forth in only one document, and 
constitute a "formal" written contract. All that 
is that such note or memorandum, as explained or 
by parole evidence and/or the surrounding 
circumstance|s, remove any serious risk that a fraud is being 
perpetrated. 
it need not 
is necessary] 
corroborated 
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In the case at bar, Machan and Western Real Estate, 
thorlzed agents,|exchanged numerous 
letters, all >: which relate directly tp the sale of the Iomega 
Park property. two separate letters^ both signed by 
Goddard, Western Rea,l Estate- acknowledged the existeiit e of a 
4 percent commission agreement with Machan, In a letter dated 
August 9, 198 5, Goddard stated that "we1only have agreed to pay 
a 4% commission on the above park All other: terms of your 
letter' ai„e acceptable." rhis letter wa^ mailed by Goddard 
subsequent to his receipt of numerous registration letters sent 
by Machan, all of which recited the existence of a commission 
agreement 
In tiis letter dated September 6, 1985, Goddard 
informed Machan that, with the exceptioii of 3 specific clients, 
all prior registration letters reciting the exi stence of a 
;ommission agreement were "acceptable." The basis for 
excluding the 3 identified clients was not due to the absence 
of a commission agreement, but rather wa[s due to the fact 
such clients had aUegedly b^en contacted prior to the receipt 
of Machanfs registration letters. Thereafter, in his 
deposition, Goddard confirmed the existence of a commission 
agreemer *--*--* tJhiat Machan would have? been paid il s 
commission procured the buyer[. While Western Real 
Estate may , * i:-. * . defeat Machan1s claim for a commission 
based upon non-performance such *• est imony fnnst Itutes a clear 
admission of the existence of an agreement. 
-11 • 
Machan's cla 
application 
Accordingly, the trial court erred in dismissing 
m for a real estate commission based upon the 
<bf the Statute of Frauds. 
ARGUMENT 
*HE CORRESPONDENCE BY AND BETWEEN MACHAN 
AND WESTERN REAL ESTATE, WHEN VIEWED WITH 
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THIS CASE AND MEASURED 
BY THE PURPOSE OF THE STATUTE, CLEARLY 
CONSTITUTES A "NOTE OR MEMORANDUM" SUFFICIENT 
TO COMPLY WITH THE STATUTE OF FRAUDS 
A. The Stature; Purpose and Intent. 
The statute of frauds as enacted in Utah, reads, in 
relevant part, as follows: 
In the following cases, every agreement 
shall be void unless such agreement, or 
some note or memorandum thereof, is in 
writing subscribed by the party to be 
charged therewith: 
* * * 
(5h Every agreement authorizing or 
employing an agent or broker to purchase or 
sell real estate for compensation. 
Utah Code Anh. § 25-5-4(5) (1984). Utah's statute, like 
similar statutes enacted in virtually every jurisdiction, is 
grounded in pver 200 years of common law and the thousands of 
cases applying the statute have generated, at best, confusing 
results. Sep generally, 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts 
§275 (1950) 
Whlile the case law interpreting the statute may be 
confusing, the purpose of the statute can be simply stated: 
11
 . . . to prevent honest men from being ensnared by perjury 
and fraud, i|n alleged contracts that they never made." Id., 
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§511 at 74 3 , Specifically, with respect to the case at: bar, 
the statute - lesigned "'foi the purposfe of protecting the 
owners of land from fraudulent and fictitious claims for a 
commisgior Fowler v. Taylor, 554 P.2d 205, 208 (Utah 
1976^ " - :. id, courts have frequently held that the 
statute frauds may be raised as a shield to fear the 
assertion of fictitious claims. 
The same courts however , have also held illicit t: he 
statute may not be utilized as a sword to sever one's 
contractual obligations voluntarily assumed. Ttiis principle 
has been set forth in numerous cases. In Keirseyv. Hirsch, 
2 65 P , Id i <1 h \ N . M 1 9F> 3)
 ( fa i" example, the court stated as 
follows: 
The statute of frauds is intended to 
protect against fraud; it is i^ ot intended 
as an escape route for person$ seeking to 
avoid obligations undertaken % or imposed 
upon them. 
Id. at 3 52, In Texas Co. v. Sloan, 231 P.2d 2 55 (Kan. 
1951), the court stated this principle ks foil ows • 
The statute of frauds was enacted to 
prevent fraud, not to foster pr encourage 
it , , the statute should b4 enforced in 
its spirit and not merely as to its 
letter. This doctrine has be#n adhered to 
down through the years and further citation 
of authority is unnecessary. .! . . The 
purpose and intent of the statute of frauds 
is to prevent fraud, and not ^o aid in its 
perpetration, and particularly the courts 
of equity, will, so far as possible, refuse 
to allow it to be used as a shield to 
protect fraud . . . . 
Id. See also, 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on 
Contracts §498 at 681 (1950) (it is not to create a loophole 
-1. 
of escape for dishonest repudiators). Faced with this 
conflicting concern, courts have attempted to satisfy the 
spirit and intent of the statute by interpreting the "writing" 
to reach the right result, or by applying some 
equitable theory, such as estoppel or part performance, to 
avoid application of the statute altogether. 
B. Note or Memorandum: Elements. 
As 
diversity in 
(1950). To 
opinions cri 
was adopted 
noted above, there has been a great deal of 
the interpretation of the "writing" requirement. 
See generally 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §498 
interpret such case law, one must "consider court 
jbically in the light of the purpose for which it 
. . . " Id., §498 at 680. 
By its terms, Utah's statute grants a court latitude 
in interpreting the "writing" requirement by requiring only the 
existence of a written "note or memorandum" rather than the 
existence of a written "formal" contract. Ney v. Harrison, 
299 P.2d lllk (Utah 1956). The formula for a note or 
memorandum is difficult to verbalize. 
We may well start with this one general 
doctrine: There are few, if any, specific 
ana uniform requirements. The statute 
itself prescribed none; and a study of the 
exlisting thousands of cases does not 
justify us in asserting their existence. 
[Footnote omitted.] Some note or 
memorandum having substantial probative 
vatLue in establishing the contract must 
exast; but its sufficiency in attaining the 
purpose of the statute depends in each case 
uppn the setting in which it is found. A 
memorandum that is sufficient in one case 
may well be held insufficient in another. 
A complete admission in court by the party 
to be charged should dispense with the 
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necessity of any writing whatever. With 
ample explanation and corroboration to be 
found in undoubted surrounding 
circumstances or even in the Accompanying 
oral testimony, a writing may! be sufficient 
even though it is cryptic, abbreviated, and 
incomplete. 
2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts, § 4 9 8 at 68 3. 
"note or memorandum" need not be set forth in a 
single document, Rather, the requirement may be fulfilled via 
a number of letters, telegrams other writings which, 
together dem« i -reement. Keirsey, 
supra. at 2 . .' - Court, ^ Gregerson v. Jensen, 617 
P.2d 369 (Utah 1980), has described the utilization of several 
writings to- overcome the statute of frauds as fullowb: 
When more than one writing is used to 
satisfy the requirements of tfye statute 
frauds, however, some nexus between the 
writings must be shown. This|requirement 
may be satisfied either by express 
reference in the signed writing to the 
unsigned one, or by implied reference 
gleaned from the contents of uhe writings 
and the circumstances surrounding the 
transaction. In the latter instance, 
parole evidence may be used td connect an 
unsigned document to one that |has been 
signed by the person to be charged. 
Id, at*. ' (citations omitted) (emphasis added) . 
The "note or memorandum" is sufficient if it 
describes with reasonable certainty: txj zr e:; 
(2) a genera 1 descri pt :i on the nroperty; - .v the 
essential terms and conditions h* ^ontrac* N_ey 
supra. See also, Restatement (Second) of Contracts % ji 
(1979); Johnson v. Allen, * .-*. *• i- i * 
well established that parole evidence may be used to explain 
- 1 5 
otherwise ambiguous writings. Gregerson v. Jensen, supra; 
Corbin on Contracts §§498, 499, 515, 527, and 
pleadings or 
memorandum." 
2 A. Corbin, 
528 (1950). |A letter whereby the author repudiates and refuses 
to perform due to the breach of the other party may constitute 
a "note or memorandum" that evidences the existence of an oral 
contract. 2 A. Corbin, Corbin on Contracts §511 (1950). 
Likewise, admissions of the existence of a contract in 
depositions may also constitute a "note or 
Id. at §519. Once again, the "note or 
memorandum" ieed not be the equivalent of a formal contract. 
All that is necessary is a showing of the existence of a 
contract sufficient enough to remove any significant fear that 
a fraud is being perpetrated. 
C. Signature). 
As|with the "note or memorandum" requirement designed 
to validate the existence of the contract, the signature 
requirement jLs designed to authenticate the "note or 
As noted above, the note or memorandum need not 
consist of ohly one document. So long as the signature appears 
on a document which adequately refers to other documents 
containing tne essential terms of the agreement, the signature 
requirement tLs satisfied. Id. at §516. 
D. Complianck With the Statute in the Case at Bar. 
memorandum. 
In| the case at bar, the letters transmitted by and 
between Machkn and Western Real Estate, the parole evidence 
introduced by deposition, and the other circumstances 
surrounding phe dispute, sufficiently demonstrate the existence 
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of a commission contract such that there is no significant 
likelihood that Machan is perpetrating a fraud. 
A review of the evidence herein reveals that after a 
conversation by and between Polcha and Goddard, wherein such 
individuals discussed the availability of Iomega Park for sale 
and the registration procedures to be used by Goddard, Goddard 
forwarded to Polcha, by letter dated February 21, 1986, certain 
information respecting the Iomega Park, together with the 
warning that any offer procured by Polcha would have to be in a 
back-up position. Shortly thereafter, Polcha delivered his 
letter, dated February 26, 1985, to Goddard wherein Polcha 
recited that he would be entitled to a 4 percent commission if 
he procured a buyer. In addition, the letter attempted to 
register various clients in accordance with Goddardfs 
procedure. Thereafter, Polcha wrote several letters all of 
which recited the 4 percent commission arrangement and 
registered additional clients. In addition, from time to time, 
Goddard provided Polcha with additional information respecting 
Iomega Park. 
At no time prior to August 1, 1985, did Goddard ever 
object to the terms of the commission agreement, or to the 
registration procedures utilized by Polcha. By letter dated 
August 7, 1985, Polcha submitted his registration for his 
client known as the Estate of James Campbell. In such 
registration letter, however, Polcha represented that the 
commission to be paid was £5 percent. In a letter dated 
August 9, 1985, signed by Goddard, Goddard responded to 
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Polcha's letter dated August 7, 1985, and stated that "we have 
only agreed "to pay a 4 percent commission on the above park. 
All other terms of your letter are acceptable." (Goddard 
Depo., Exhibit 19; Appendix 3.) By this letter, Goddard 
affirmed the existence of a commission agreement and identified 
the rate of commission as 4 percent. 
ByI a letter dated September 6, 1985, Goddard 
disavowed any commission obligation to Machan with respect to 3 
clients previously registered by Polcha. Goddard disavowed 
:ion not on the basis that there was no commission such obligat 
agreement by 
rather on th 
September 6, 
the totality! 
and between Western Real Estate and Machan, but 
k basis that such clients had been contacted with 
respect to tne Iomega Park prior to Polcha's registration of 
the same. Moreover, other than those clients allegedly 
contacted prior to Polcha's registration, Goddard stated that 
all registration letters "are acceptable." (Goddard Depo., 
Exhibit 21; jkppendix 4.) When the letters dated August 9 and 
1985, which are signed by Goddard, are viewed in 
of circumstances, there is little doubt that there 
existed an oral commission agreement by and between Machan and 
Western Real| Estate. 
Tol the extent the foregoing correspondence does not 
adequately eliminate the fear of a fraud, one need only review 
s deposition transcript. In response to a question 
explained his belief that Polcha was not entitled 
Mr. Goddard' 
as to how hel 
to a commission, Goddard responded as follows: 
Bop was aware we were working with Cap 
Co|rp., and it was Cap Corp. that brought us 
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the deal, not Machan Properties. Had 
Machan walked in with this deal from Machan 
Properties, then they would have received 
the commission, but just to arbitrarily 
mail out a letter with no closing date on 
the contract, anybody can do that. That's 
what I told him. 'Had you brought us the 
deal we would have honored your 
commission. You didn't. Cap Corp. has 
brought us the deal. We have been working 
with Cap Corp. since day one, and you're 
fully aware of it, so whether their 
investors just happened to be your 
investors is a personal problem.• 
(Goddard Depo. pp. 45, 46; Appendix 5.) From the above, it is 
clear that had Machan procured the buyer, i.e., performed under 
the commission agreement, Western Real Estate would have 
honored the commission. In other words, Western Real Estate 
refused to pay because Machan did not perform, not because 
there was no agreement. 
Later in his deposition, Goddard reiterated a 
conversation he had with Mr. Mullins, president of Western 
Mortgage. The subject of the conversation concerned Goddardfs 
revelation to Mr. Mullin that Machan previously had registered 
Birtcher, the ultimate purchaser on the property, with Western 
Real Estate. In response to the question "and what did Mr. 
Mullins say to you in response," Goddard answered as follows: 
i 
My comment was I had received a 
registration from Machan Properties back in 
the spring from Birtcher, and that, you 
know, there may be a situation there that 
he might want to look at, and he said, 'Oh, 
absolutely not. How does he possibly feel 
he deserves a commission when he didn't 
bring us the deal, Cap Corp. did?' I 
said, I'm just telling you there was a 
registration letter back in the spring, so 
he said something to the effect, 'well, 
there's no way he could justify a 
-19-
Western Real 
based on the 
conlmission if he didn't do anything. • So 
that about ended it. 
(Goddard Depo. p. 76.) 
Th4 foregoing deposition testimony clearly shows that 
Estate's refusal to pay Machan a 4% commission was 
fact that Machan did not procure the ultimate 
buyer. At nd> time during the course of the deposition did 
Goddard indicate that he did not agree to pay Machan a 4% 
commission ii Machan procured a buyer. The dispute, therefore, 
resolves around whether or not Machan was the procuring cause 
of Birtcher's purchase, not whether Western Real Estate agreed 
to pay Machan a commission of 4% if Machan was such a procuring 
cause. Under these circumstances, the requirements of the 
Statute of Frauds have been met. 
In 
CONCLUSION 
service of its purpose and intent, the Statute of 
Frauds must be utilized solely as a shield against the 
perpetration of fraud, and not as a sword to sever one's 
contractual obligations voluntarily assumed. In the case at 
bar, the letters executed by Goddard, when viewed in the 
totality of the circumstances, clearly demonstrate the 
existence of a 4 percent commission agreement by and between 
Machan and Western Real Estate. Goddard's deposition testimony 
further compels the same conclusion. Accordingly, Machan has 
met the requirements of the Statute of Frauds and the trial 
court's contrary ruling must be reversed. 
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RESPECTFULLY SUBMITTED this 2,5th day of February, 
1988. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER 
& NELSON 
MICHAEL N. EMERt " ^ 
Attorney for Appell^rtC 
Machan Hampshire Properties, 
Inc. 
MAILING CERTIFICATE 
I HEREBY CERTIFY that a true and correct copy of the 
foregoing instrument was mailed, first class, postage prepaid 
on this 25th day of February, 1988, to the following counsel of 
record: 
Dan S. Bushnell 
David M. Wahlquist 
James J. Cassity 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111 
MACH/AB/MNE 
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APPENDIX 1 
DAVID M. WAHLQUIST - A3349 
ATTORNEYS FOR DEFENDANTS 
330 SOUTH THIRD EAST 
SALT LAKE CITY, UTAH 84111 
TELEPHONE (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT FOR THE COUNTY OF SALT LAKE 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACHAN HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES, 
INC., a Utah corporation. 
Plaintiff, 
vs. 
WESTERN REAL ESTATE & DEVELOP-
MENT COMPANY, a Utah corpora-
tion; WESTERN MORTGAGE AND 
LOAN CORPORATION, a Utah 
corporation; K-E ENTERPRISES, 
a Utah general partnership; 
BIRTCHER INVESTMENTS, a 
California general partnership, 
BIRTCHER AMERICAN PROPERTIES, 
a California association; and 
CAPITALCORP FINANCIAL, INC., 
a California corporation, 
Defendants. 
ORDER 
Ciyil No. C85-7387 
Jucfge Leonard Russon 
Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment 
against defendant Western Real Estate & Development Company and 
the Motion of defendants Western Real Estate & Development 
Company, Western Mortgage Loan Corporation and K-E Enterprises 
for Summary Judgment against plaintiff came on for hearing 
before the above-entitled court on April 28, 1986 at the hour of 
2:00 p.m. Plaintiff appeared by its counsel of record, 
Lewis T. Stevens and Craig W. Anderson of Van Wagoner & Stevens. 
Defendants appeared by their counsel of record, Dan S. Bushnell 
and David M. Wahlquist of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell. 
HaviJng heard argument of counsel and read extensive 
memoranda filed by the parties and being otherwise advised in 
the premises, THE COURT HEREBY ORDERS: 
1. Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Judgment i 
against defendant Western Real Estate & Development Company is 
denied; and 
2. Tjhe Motion of defendants Western Real Estate & 
Development Company, Western Mortgage Loan Corporation and K-E 
Enteprises for Summary Judgment against plaintiff is granted 
dismissing plaintiff's action against said defendants because 
plaintiff's claim is barred by the Statute of Frauds set forth 
in Utah Code 
memorializing th 
Ann. §25-5-4(5) because no writing exists 
b claimed agreement to pay a commission, 
Dated this ry^^? day of 1986. 
BY THE COURT: 
^ ^ ^ - v , - / f-lix < wi 
JUJJ'GE LEONARD RUSSON 
ATTEST 
H. DIXON Hli-JDi.E-Y 
Clerk 
By <& ^ 9lOT\ dM6**f' 
Dcpflty Clerk 
APPENDIX 2 
Dan S. Bushnell - A522 
David M. Wahlquist - A3349 
James J. Cassity -A595 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Attorneys for Defendants 
Birtcher Investments, Birtcher 
American Properties and 
Capitalcorp Financial, Inc. 
330 South Third East 
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111-2599 
Telephone: (801) 521-3680 
IN THE THIRD JUDICIAL DISTRICT COURT FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY 
STATE OF UTAH 
MACHAN HAMPSHIRE PROPERTIES, 
INC., a Utah corporation, : STIPULATION AND ORDER 
Plaintiff, 
vs. : Civil No. C85-7387 
WESTERN REAL ESTATE & DEVELOP- : 
MENT COMPANY, et al. : 
: JTudge Leonard Russon 
Defendants. : 
Plaintiff Machan Hampshire Properties, through its counsel 
of record, Michael N. Emery, Esq. of Richards, Brandt, Miller and 
Nelson, and all named defendants through their counsel of record, 
David M. Wahlquist, of Kirton, McConkie & Bushnell, hereby 
stipulate as follows: 
1. The Motion of defendants Birtcher Investments, Birtcher 
American Properties and Capitalcorp Financial, Inc. for summary 
judgment dismissing plaintiff's Second Claim for Relief against 
them with prejudice may be granted. The parties agree that under 
the current state of the law in the State of Utah, there can be no 
tortious interference with a contract which is unenforceable under 
U.C.A. §25-5-4(5). On June 23, 1986, the court entered an order 
dismissing plaintiff's First Claim for Relief because the alleged 
(unenforceable under U.C.A. §25-5-4(5). The parties 
tand and agree that in the event plaintiff is 
contract was 
hereto underi 
successful in obtaining a reversal of this Order, then the 
dismissal of this Second Claim for Relief will also be deemed to 
be reversed hfecause it is presently based solely on the Court's 
Order, of June | 23, 1986. 
2. Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief may be dismissed with 
prejudice. 
3. Plaintiff's time for appeal of the June 23, 1986 order 
shall begin uo run upon entry of the following Order, all issues 
in this mattejr having been reduced to judgment. 
1987. 
RICHARDS, BRANDT, MILLER & NELSON 
DATED t l i t s 7M day o f tWwtk*; 
BY. 
Michael N. Emery 
Attorney for Plaintiff 
KIRTON, McCONKIE & BUSHNELL 
Dan S. Bushnell 
David M. Wahlquist 
James J. Cassity 
Attorneys for defendants: 
Birtcher Investments 
Birtcher American Properties, 
Machan Hampshire Properties, 
Inc. 
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ORDER 
Based on the foregoing Stipulation of counsel for the 
respective parties and being otherwise advised in the premises, 
the Court hereby orders as follows: 
1. The Motion of defendants Birtcher Investments, Birtcher 
American Properties and Capitalcorp Financial, Inc. for summary 
judgment dismissing plaintiff's Second 
them with prejudice is hereby granted on 
(a) Under the current law of the State of Utah, there can be 
estate commission in this 
no tortious interference win 
unenforceable under U.C.A. §25J-5-4(5) ; and 
(b) The Court has previously ruleq on June 23, 1986 that the 
alleged contract for a real 
matter is unenforceable because it does not satisfy the 
requirements of U.C.A, §25-5-4(5). 
2. Plaintiff's Third Claim for Relief is hereby dismissed 
with prejudice based solely on the foreaoing consent and 
stipulation of the parties. 
3. Plaintiff's time for appeal of the June 23, 1986 Order 
shall begin to run upon entry of this (l)rder, all other issues in 
Claim for Relief against 
the basis that: 
th contract which is 
this matter having been reduced, to judgment. 
DATED this 
C' 
day of Jj'Jl ' / 
BY THE C0URT: 
/ 
rnjki 
./ 1987. 
Leoiiard S. Russon, District Judge 
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Approved as Form: 
Attorney for 
Emery 
Plaintiff 
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APPENDIX 3 
M \' WESTERN 
August 9, 1985 
Robert F. Polcha 
Machan Hampshire Properties 
1981 East Murray Holladay Road 
Salt Lake City. Utah 84117-5139 
Re: Registration of Client 
Iomega Park 
James Campbell 
Dear Bob: 
In response to your letter, we only have agreed to pay a 4% 
commission on the above park. All other terms of your letter are 
acceptable. 
Ver^ y ^ ruly yours, 
Kelly God^krd 
President 
JKG/lh 
> I U R N Rf3A(. * p i A T P A N D PITVCSUQFHvlFMT C O M P A N Y 
Box 3 Q B 8 / Ogden. U t a h 8<4<aOS / IB01J B 2 M B 7 3 
APPENDIX 4 
WESTERN 
September 6, 1985 
Robert F. Polcha 
Machan Hampshire Properties Inc. 
1981 E. Murray Holladay Rd. 
S.L.C. Utah 84117-5139 
Re: Iomega Park Roy Utah 
Dear Bob: 
I have been receiving your letters of registration of clients. Though 
most are acceptable the following were contacted prior to receipt of 
your letters. 
1. Deftuza Corporation 
2. August Financial 
3. Birtcher Properties/Cap Corp 
Therefore we can not recognize the above. Should you have any questions 
please contact me. 
^Jery truly yours, 
Kelly Goddard 
President 
JKG/ns 
E S T E R N REAL ESTATE A N D D E V E L O P M E N T C O M P A N Y 
D. Box 3 0 B B / Ogden, U t a h 8 4 « a 0 9 / [B01] 6 2 1 - 1 3 7 3 
APPENDIX 5 
Birtcher and Polcha had not delivered the deal from Birtcher, 
I told him I didn't think so. 
Q. You did not think Mr. folcha was entitled to the 
commission? 
A. No. 
Q. Am I understanding you correctly? 
A. That's correct, I did uot think he was entitled 
to it. 
Q. And how did you explain that to Mr. Polcha, as 
well as you can recall? How did you explain your belief that 
you thought he was not entitled to t^e commission? 
A. Well ~ 
MR. POELMAN: Are you wbndering what he said to 
MR. STEVENS: Yes. 
MR. POELMAN: Okay. 
Bob was aware v;e were wdrking w i t h Cap/Corp. , 
him? 
A. 
and it was Cap/Corp, that brought us 
Properties. Had Machan walked in with this deal from Machan 
the deal, not Machan 
Properties, then they would have rece 
just to arbitrarily mail out a letter 
ived the commission, but 
with no closing date on 
the contract, anybody can dc that, that's what I told hiir.. 
"Had you brought us the deal, we would have honored your 
a*<~***mmt*0m+mmmm*** 
commiss ion . You d i d n ' t . Cap/Corp, has brought us the d e a l . 
- - V ' ~ *r L — ii ~i- wnmmu>~--
We have been working wi th C a p / C o r p . s i n c e day one , and you're 
DEANNA H. ATKINSON1 ~ CAPITAL REPORTERS 
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Examination by Mr. Stevens 
ful ly aware of i t , so whether the i r inves tors j u s t happened 
kr investors i s a personal Diubiyill. "• 
Q . 
A. 
was not 
if it ki 
much ended 
Q. 
Okay. How did Mr. Polcha respond? 
He was mad. 
Do you recall anything he said? 
He indicated that it was a large commission, he 
oirg to walk away from it. He said he'd file suit; 
led the deal, it would kill the deal; and pretty 
it there. 
After that conversation, did you have any other 
conversations with Mr. Polcha? 
A. 
Q. 
Polcha? 
A. 
Q. 
that ti me 
A. 
Q. 
A. 
Q. 
Birtcher 
A. 
prior to 
Q. 
No. 
That was your last telephone call with Mr. 
Telephone conversation. 
Have you exchanged correspondence subsequent to 
After that? 
Yes. 
No. 
Okay. When did you first have a contact with 
[ you personally? 
I had never discussed or talked to Birtcher 
the offer. 
That would have been prior to September 27th? 
